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deHoll: Vital Surgery or Unnecessary Procedure? Rethinking the Propriety
VITAL SURGERY OR UNNECESSARY PROCEDURE?
RETHINKING THE PROPRIETY OF HOSPITAL LIABILITY
FOR NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING

I.

INTRODUCTION

Hospitals know best who is qualified to provide medical care. 1 For
generations, this truth has been confirmed by the fact that doctors seeking use of
hospital facilities to treat their patients must first gain deliberated approval from
their peers in medicine to "practice [their] art" at hospitals.2 Through detailed
review of a private physician's skills, education, and experiences, medical peer
review, known as credentialing, serves as the mechanism whereby members of
the medical community ensure that only competent practitioners may treat their
patients in hospitals. 3 However, in an era of tort law marked by increased
instances and theories of medical malpractice liability, a number of states' courts
now allow patients to4 recover from hospitals for negligence in hospitals'
credentialing activities.
Broadly, negligent credentialing is a theory in which the recipient of a
harmful service recovers from a gatekeeping entity for allowing the provider of
that service to engage in the activities that caused the recipient harm.5 Some
states apply this concept to healthcare by allowing patients injured by their
private physicians to sue the hospital for their injuries. 6 In such cases, the
hospital is liable for negligently deciding that the injurious physicians were
qualified to perform the medical procedures that harmed the physicians'
patients.7 The prospect of such liability causes hospitals' credentialing bodies to
more closely scrutinize doctors seeking practice privileges and to predict the8
likelihood of a particular doctor engaging in (or being sued for) malpractice.
Thus, the theoretical result of the availability of negligent credentialing liability
is an increase in the quality of doctors permitted to treat patients in hospitals.
Although such an outcome is desirable, negligent credentialing liability
causes hospitals to achieve that outcome through flawed means. By making a
third-party physician's medical competence and quality of care a question for
juries, the focus of a hospital's peer review committee moves from a substantive
evaluation of competence to an educated guess at avoiding liability. The inquiry

1. See Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989).
2.
Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Auth. v. Prince, 249 S.E.2d 581, 584 (Ga. 1978).
3.
See Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals' Physician
Credentialingand Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 597, 598-99 (2000).
4. See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 306 (Minn. 2007).
5.
Cf Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that
hospitals are responsible for ensuring the competency of physicians who receive staff privileges).
6.
See Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 306.
7.
See Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1045 (Ohio 1990), overruled on other
grounds by Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994).
8.
See Lu Ann Trevifio, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act: Sword or Shield?,
22 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 315, 342 (1997).
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is no longer: "Is Dr. Jones truly qualified to treat his patients here?"; rather, the
question is: "What is the likelihood that Dr. Jones will get us sued?" Any
increase in the average caliber of private physicians at a particular hospital is
thus incidental. Meanwhile, the cause of action can visit a number of problems
upon a community's healthcare system, including a shortage of physicians and
surgeons, an increase in healthcare costs, a lowered availability of local medical
services, and an overall decrease in the average quality of patient care.
Additionally, once the claim applies to hospital peer review activity, it could
spread to other licensed professions. 9
Negligent credentialing has yet to become law in South Carolina. 0 Neither
appellate court has squarely decided whether someone can sue a hospital for
negligently permitting a medical practitioner to admit and treat patients at its
facilities. It is likely that at least part of the reason negligent credentialing is
not an available cause of action is because South Carolina has statutes12
privileging information obtained and produced in the credentialing process.
South Carolina's courts have consistently protected this privilege in healthcare13
litigation because of its importance in facilitating quality medical services.
However, a circuit court recently held that notwithstanding the privilege, 14
a
patient may sue a hospital for negligent credentialing in South Carolina.
Because that case is now on appeal, it is likely that one or both of South
Carolina's appellate courts will soon have to decide whether patients can sue
South Carolina hospitals for negligent credentialing.
This Comment argues that South Carolina should not recognize a cause of
action for negligent credentialing
against hospitals. Part II summarizes the
• 16
credentialing, or privileging, process, the elements of a negligent credentialing
cause of action, the common defenses to the claim, and treatment of the claim
throughout the United States. Part Ill examines South Carolina laws pertaining to

9.
This is not to say that the needs of the injured patient and the goals of the negligent
credentialing theory should be ignored. Certainly, a person deserves compensation for injuries
wrongfully received, and improved healthcare is a desirable goal. However, negligent
credentialing's greatest flaw is that it causes these harms unnecessarily, as injured patients may use
other, already accepted tort theories against a hospital without eroding the integrity of peer review
processes. See infra Part IV.E.
10. 18 S.C. JUR. Hospitals § 17 (2008).
11. See, e.g., Strickland v. Madden, 323 S.C. 63, 72, 448 S.E.2d 581, 586 (Ct. App. 1994)
(per curiam) (declining to recognize a cause of action for negligent credentialing).
12. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-71-10 to -20 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
13. See Durham v. Vinson, 360 S.C. 639, 649, 602 S.E.2d 760, 765 (2004); McGee v. Bruce
Hosp. Sys., 312 S.C. 58, 62, 439 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1993); Wieters v. Bon-Secours-St. Francis
Xavier Hosp., Inc., 378 S.C. 160, 172, 662 S.E.2d 430, 436-37 (Ct. App. 2008), vacated, 381 S.C.
332, 332, 673 S.E.2d 417,417-18 (2009).
14. See Person v. Carolina Pines Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 2004-CP-16-322, slip op. at 9
(Darlington County Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Order].
15. See Notice of Appeal, Person v. Carolina Pines Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 2004-CP-16-322
(Ct. App. May 21, 2008). The South Carolina Court of Appeals' case tracking number is
200891766.
16. This Comment treats these terms as synonymous and uses them interchangeably.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss5/10

2

deHoll: Vital Surgery or Unnecessary Procedure? Rethinking the Propriety
2009]

1129

TORT LAW

the privileging process and a circuit court's interpretation of these laws. Part IV
explores the problems and benefits of allowing a negligent credentialing claim as
well as alternative theories of recovery currently available in South Carolina.
Finally, Part V suggests that should South Carolina appellate courts choose to
allow negligent credentialing claims, they should refrain from doing so until
presented with adequate facts for a landmark decision.
II.

OVERVIEW

OF
THE
CREDENTIALING LAW

CREDENTIALING

PROCESS

AND

NEGLIGENT

17
Negligent credentialing is a subset of the concept of corporate negligence.
Corporate negligence entails holding a corporation directly liable for harmful
acts or omissions proximately caused by persons working in conjunction with
the corporation.18 In elemental form, a negligent credentialing claim is
essentially a specialized claim for negligence. 19

A.

Overview of the CredentialingProcess

The process of credentialing nonemployee physicians to practice in hospitals
plays no small part in medicine. Doctors who wish to treat their patients at a
particular hospital must have credentials to admit patients and conduct
procedures using hospital facilities. 20 Hospital peer review committees determine
whether to grant physicians staff privileges to treat and admit patients and
whether the committees should later expand, limit, suspend, or revoke that
physician's privileges. 21 Many committees render decisions using the
credentialing criteria established by the Joint Commission, a national healthcare
accreditation organization.22 These criteria include current licensure; training and
experience relevant to the type of privileges sought; physical and mental health;

17. See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 307 & n.4 (Minn. 2007). Corporate
negligence includes other tortious conduct, such as negligent hiring, see Id. at 308, and negligent
supervision, see Oehler v. Humana Inc., 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1989) (per curiam).
18. Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr. (Simmons 1), 330 S.C. 115, 123, 498 S.E.2d 408,
412 (Ct. App. 1998), aff'd as modified on other grounds, 341 S.C. 32, 53, 533 S.E.2d 312, 323
(2000).
19. See, e.g., Albain v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1045-46 (Ohio 1990) (describing
negligent credentialing as a combination of a breach of duty of care and proximate causation of
injuries), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628
N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994).
20. Michelle M. Kwon, Comment, Move over Marcus Welby, M.D. and Make Way for
Managed Care: The Implications of Capitation, Gag Clauses, and Economic Credentialing, 28
TEX. TECH L. REv. 829, 851 (1997).
21. Carol R. M. Moss, Note, You Do Know What You're Doing? Right, Doc? Minnesota
Supreme Court Contemplates Negligent Credentialing and Privileging,30 HAMLJNE L. REv. 125,
140 (2007) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 145.61(5)(i) (1998)).
22. Id. (citing Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations,
http://www.jointcoimnission.org (last visited May 17, 2009)).
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competence; currently pending challenges to licensure; previous successful
challenges to licensure; involvement in a malpractice action; voluntary or
involuntary withdrawal or reduction of privileges at another hospital; and peer
recommendations.23 As required for Joint Commission accreditation, peer review
committees must periodically reevaluate the qualifications of a credentialed
physician to ensure that the physician does not develop a pattern of
incompetence. 24 This counterbalances another Joint Commission accreditation
requirement that practitioners be able to obtain credentials to practice in the
hospital without direction from hospital staff 25
In addition to following Joint Commission criteria, or as an alternative to
them, some hospitals use their own credentialing criteria that more closely reflect
26
their specific needs, goals, and concerns regarding practitioner qualifications.
No matter what standards a hospital uses for its peer review decisions, federal
regulations require that its peer review committee take certain actions during the
committee's credentialing processes. 27 When a practitioner applies for hospital
privileges, the peer review committee must request a report from the National
Practitioner Data Bank; if the committee grants
privileges, it must thereafter
28
periodically request information from the Bank.
The credentialing process begins with
an
• 29 the practitioner requesting
application from the peer review committee. If the committee has interest in
the applicant, it sends the applicant an application, a list of its privileging
criteria, and copies of the hospital's bylaws. 3 The applicant then completes the
application by providing copies of current state medical licenses and Drug
Enforcement Agency registration numbers; copies of professional liability
insurance and information on policy limits; information on education, training,
and board certifications; letters of recommendation; and information on health
status, location, and any past disciplinary action. 31 The applicant also gives the

23. See JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., COMPREHENSIVE
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: TiE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK §§ MS.5.5-5.8 (1999).
24.

See Albain, 553 N.E.2d at 1045.

25.

See JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., supra note 23, at

§§ MS.1.1.1. 1.1.2.
26. See, e.g., Andrews v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 540 N.E.2d 447, 449 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(indicating that defendant hospital developed its own bylaws in addition to Joint Commission
standards).
27. Moss, supra note 21.
28. Id. at 140-41. The Bank contains information on each licensed physician, as required by
federal regulations. Id. at 141 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.7-.9 (2007)). Doctors, hospitals, medical
malpractice carriers, and governmental agencies (including state medical boards) must report
investigations, adverse actions, malpractice verdicts or settlements and any other information that
the Secretary of Health and Human Services deems necessary to report. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 60.8
(2007)). This information is confidential and is not available to the public. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. §
60.11 (2007)).
29. LEwIS M. LEVIN, MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO OBTAINING
AND KEEPING HOSPITAL STAFF PRIVILEGES 41 (1991).

30.
31.

Id. at 42.
Id.
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32
committee permission to view all records of the applicant's past performance.
When the committee receives the completed application, it verifies the
documents and information for accuracy and may solicit the medical staff for
opinions on the applicant.33 The committee then forwards the application to the
appropriate member of the department for which credentials are sought 34 for
review and recommendation. 3If the department member makes a favorable
recommendation, the committee undertakes its own review and makes a
recommendation. 36 The application then goes to the hospital's medical executive
committee for a third review, and then the hospital's board makes the final
approval. 7

B. Elements of the Cause ofAction
Negligent credentialing is essentially a subset of the basic negligence
claim. 38The cause of action consists of the standard negligence elements: duty,
breach, actual causation, proximate causation, and injury. 39 The specific types of
facts a plaintiff must prove to make out a prima facie case are what characterize
the tort.
1.

Duty

Negligent credentialing rests on the assumption that a hospital owes the
public a duty to allow only competent medical practitioners to work on its

32. Id.
33. Id. at 42-43.
34. For example, obstetrics or neurology.
35. LEVIN, supra note 29, at 43.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 354 S.E.2d 455, 457 (N.C. 1987); St.
Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 513 (Tex. 1997) (Cornyn, J., dissenting)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)). At least one state has instead based
recognition of the claim through analogy to negligent entrustment. See Mitchell County Hosp. Auth.
v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412,414 (Ga. 1972).
39. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (citing Hansen v.
Wash. Natural Gas Co., 632 P.2d 504, 505 (Wash. 1981)). Courts and commentators present
different formulations of a prima facie negligence case. Compare David G. Owen, The Five
Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1674 (2007) (explaining a five-element
formulation), with Baggerly v. CSX Transp., Inc., 370 S.C. 362, 368-69, 635 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2006)
(citing Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 422, 529 S.E.2d 710, 712 (2000)) (combining damages and
both types of causation into one element), and Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Reg.,
336 S.C. 373, 387, 520 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1999) (citing Bishop v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 331
S.C. 79, 88, 502 S.E.2d 78, 82 (1998)) (treating actual and proximate causation as a single element).
This Comment adopts the five-element model because it provides the clearest framework for
discussion of negligent credentialing, both in its theory and in its application to cases.
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premises. This duty encompasses a variety of specific tasks, including creating
adequate credentialing procedures; 41 following these procedures in deciding
whether to grant or renew privileges to a particular practitioner;42 and
withdrawing these privileges when the hospital has notice of a practitioner's
misconduct or incompetence.43 These duties do not necessarily end at the
hospital's door. For example, a Massachusetts court allowed a patient to sue a
hospital for negligently credentialing a physician who sexually assaulted his
patient in the patient's home. 44 Such a case is likely not anomalous. As the
existence of the duty turns on whether the harm was foreseeable to the hospital,
this example is in keeping with Justice Cardozo's famous "danger zone" from
Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co.45 and illustrates just how broad that zone
apparently can be.
The standard of care for any of these duties may come from several sources.
A typical negligent credentialing state holds a hospital to a national standard of
care and uses Joint Commission accreditation rules as the basis for that
standard. Meanwhile, a minority
, .47 position defines the standard of care by
behavior within a hospital's walls. Some derive the standard of care from the
hospital's own bylaws, regulations, and credentialing standards,48 while others
take such rules and practices as highly probative evidence of what the standard

40. See Register v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 377 A.2d 8, 10 (Del. 1977); Candler Gen.
Hosp., Inc. v. Persaud, 442 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp.,
183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d
156, 164 (Wis. 1981)); Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 168.
41. See, e.g., Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991) (citing Wood v.
Samaritan Inst., 161 P.2d 556, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945) (in bank)) (noting that hospitals have a
"duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the
patients").
42. See, e.g., Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 723 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007) ("Hospitals are required to exercise reasonable care in the granting of medical staff
privileges."). Conceivably, this task could be split into two instances of negligence: negligently
reviewing a doctor's qualifications and negligently granting the doctor privileges. However, no
reported case provides an example of a court actually treating these acts as separate instances of
negligence.
43. See, e.g., Copithorne v. Framingham Union Hosp., 520 N.E.2d 139, 141-43 (Mass. 1988)
(holding that a reasonable jury could have found that a hospital violated its duty to a patient by
"failing to take sufficient action in response to previous allegations" of a doctor's wrongdoing).
Such a duty closely reflects that of negligent hiring and supervision. See infra Part IV.E.4.
44. Copithorne, 520 N.E.2d at 141-43.
45. 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
46. See, e.g., Frigo, 876 N.E.2d at 723 (citing Coleman v. Bessemer Carraway Methodist
Med. Ctr., 589 So. 2d 703, 706 (Ala. 1991)) (noting that a hospital's compliance with Joint
Commission requirements may be sufficient for summary judgment in its favor). If negligent
credentialing becomes law in South Carolina, the courts would likely apply some national standard
of care. See McMillan v. Durant, 312 S.C. 200, 207, 439 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1993) (extending a
national standard of care for tort actions against healthcare professionals).
47. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 399 N.E.2d 198, 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (stating
that a hospital's bylaws imposed a duty to assist physicians in obtaining consultations from peers).
48. See, e.g., id. (finding that the bylaws created a direct duty).
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should be. 49 Several states look to legislative acts for guidance in determining
the proper standard of care. For example, a Florida court held that because a
state statute imposes upon hospitals a duty to select competent physicians,
granting privileges to an incompetent doctor who injures a patient on the
hospital's premises constitutes a breach of duty. 51 Nebraska law provides that a
hospital's violation of its own healthcare quality regulation supplies evidence of
negligence but is not conclusive of a breach of duty. 52 Lastly, federal law
provides that a hospital has a duty to periodically request physician information
from the National Practitioner Data Bank. 53
2. Breach
One defining characteristic of negligent credentialing is that a plaintiff must
prove an underlying occurrence of medical malpractice by the treating physician
in addition to the hospital's breach of duty. 54 This implies that courts view the
claim as derivative in nature, in that the plaintiff cannot recover from the hospital
without also showing other, independently actionable conduct by the
practitioner. In such cases, the plaintiff must be able to prove professional
negligence against the physician who directly caused the plaintiffs injury in
addition to a breach of duty by the hospital. Courts differ as to whether the
plaintiff must satisfy this dual-breach requirement by either joining the doctor in
the suit or showing recovery in a separate lawsuit, as opposed to merely

49. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965)
(stating that a hospital's bylaws, regulations, and standards aided the jury in determining the
standard of care).
50. See, e.g., Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (noting
the California legislature's efforts to ensure quality healthcare and protect patients); Insinga v.
LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (finding that Florida's legislature expressly codified the
doctrine of negligent credentialing).
51. Insinga, 543 So. 2d at 214; see also Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d
156, 169 (Wis. 1981) (finding no conflict between health regulatory scheme and common law duty
of care).
52. See Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'l Hosp., 173 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Neb. 1970).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 11 135(a)(2) (2000).
54. See, e.g., Trichel v. Caire, 427 So. 2d 1227, 1233 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that
because there was no negligence on the part of the physician, the hospital was not liable for its grant
of privileges to the physician); Hiroms v. Scheffey, 76 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. App. 2002) (noting
that if the doctor is not found negligent there can be no negligent credentialing claim against the
hospital).
55. See, e.g., Humana Med. Corp. of Ala. v. Traffanstedt, 597 So. 2d 667, 669 (Ala. 1992)
(stating the necessity of underlying physician liability); Grobman v. Posey, 863 So. 2d 1230, 123536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting William D. Underwood & Michael D. Morrison,
Apportioning Responsibility in Cases Involving Claims of Vicarious, Derivative, or Statutory
Liability for Harm Directly Caused by the Conduct of Another, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 617, 619
(2003)) (same).
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showing, as part of the negligent credentialing claim, that the plaintiff could
prove the doctor's liability.
On the other hand, a small minority of states allow a patient to recover
against a hospital for injuries received from a private physician, even if the
physician did not negligently injure the patient. 57 The rationale is that because
negligent credentialing is a direct theory of liability, the actions of a third party
are irrelevant to proving a failure to uphold the duty of care. 58 Thus, hospitals in
single-breach states may be liable for a doctor's nontortious conduct.
Regardless of a particular court's position on this issue, a plaintiff must at
least prove the hospital's breach of duty. A hospital will have breached its duty if
it has actual or constructive knowledge of conduct that should cause it to deny or
withdraw privileges and it fails to do so. 59 A hospital fails to exercise reasonable
care in performing its credentialing duties either by not obtaining information
that is reasonably available to it or by not making a reasonable decision whether
60
to grant, renew, or continue privileges based on the information before it.
3. Actual Causation
The minimum standard for actual causation is that the physician's conduct
was, at the very least, a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. If the
state in question requires a doctor's negligence as part of the claim, that same
negligent conduct must be the substantial factor. 61 Other courts require a plaintiff
to show that but for a hospital's lack of care in allowing a doctor to practice on
its premises, the doctor would not have received credentials and would not have
injured the plaintiff. 62 In a state using the dual-breach rule, the plaintiff must

56. Compare Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Ill. 1965)
(noting that plaintiff had settled negligence claim against doctor before proceeding to trial against
hospital), with Stottlemyer v. Ghramn, 597 S.E.2d 191, 192 (Va. 2004) (noting that the trial court
bifurcated the claims of the doctor and the hospital and made the plaintiff's ability to proceed
against the hospital contingent upon the plaintiff first winning negligence action against the doctor).
57. See, e.g., Moser v. Heistand, 681 A.2d 1322, 1325 (Pa. 1996) (explaining that a patient
need not prove a third party's negligence because a hospital's duty runs directly to the patient); cf
Dicks v. U.S. Health Corp., No. 95 CA 2350, 1996 WL 263239, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10,
1996) (holding that a negligent credentialing claim against a hospital was severable from any related
claims the patient sought to assert against a physician).
58. See Moser, 681 A.2d at 1325.
59. See Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, 466 (Ariz. 1980). For example, failure to request
information from the National Practitioner Data Bank results in a presumption that the hospital has
knowledge of all the doctor's records on file at the bank. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(b) (2000).
60. See, e.g., Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991) (citing Johnson v.
Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 174-75 (Wis. 1981)) (noting that hospitals have a
"duty to select and retain only competent physicians").
61. See, e.g., Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 158 (noting that a plaintiff must prove a doctor's
negligence to provide the causal link between the hospital's grant of privileges and the plaintiff's
injuries).
62. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (explaining
that a plaintiff must show "that even if the hospital had made the recommended and acknowledged
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show two causal connections to the injury: one from the doctor and one from the
hospital.63
4.

Proximate Causation

As for proximate causation, the normal negligence standards apply. 64 Basic
tort theory teaches that defendants are liable for all injuries caused by their
breach of duty until a supervening act destroys the nexus between the breach and
an injury. 65 Accordingly, by negligently granting a doctor privileges, a hospital
could proximately cause the injury of any patient whose injuries foreseeably
stem from that doctor's connection to the hospital. 66 This includes patients
admitted under a doctor's exercise of privilege 67 and conceivably includes
patients who rely on their knowledge of the doctor's privileges as part of the
decision to have that doctor treat them in the first place.
5.

Injury

Lastly, the plaintiff must have suffered some physical harm at the hands of
the credentialed practitioner. This requirement does not differ from the injury
requirement of the typical personal injury negligence claim. 69 Regardless of the

checks they would have denied staff privileges" in order to establish the hospital's liability); Albain
v. Flower Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 1038, 1045 (Ohio 1990) (citing Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164) ("[A]

plaintiff must demonstrate that but for the hospital's lack of care in selecting the physician, the
physician would not have been granted staff privileges and the plaintiff would not have been
injured."), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628
N.E.2d 46, 53 (Ohio 1994).
63. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 716 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1998) (stating that plaintiff suing for negligent credentialing must show a practitioner
possessing negligently granted privileges negligently caused the injury).
64. See Bickham v. Inphynet, Inc., 899 So. 2d 15, 18 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
65. See Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 400-01, 477 S.E.2d 715, 721 (Ct. App. 1996)
(citations omitted) ("Foreseeability is determined by looking to the natural and probable
consequences of the act complained of... A plaintiff therefore proves legal cause by establishing
the injury in question occurred as a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
negligence.").
66. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 342 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (deciding that a
causal connection exists if, as a matter of ordinary experience, a particular act or omission might be
expected to produce a particular result and that result occurs).
67. See, e.g., Denton Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. LaCroix, 947 S.W.2d 941, 942-43, 956 (Tex. App.
1997) (finding hospital's inadequate privileging procedures proximately caused brain damage from
administration of anesthesia).
68. See id. at 950; cf. Gay Parks Rainville, When a Biomedical Device Fails: Navigating the
Regulatory and Legal Landscape, INTELL. PROP. & TECH.L.J., Feb. 2007, at 12 (stating injury as
part of the general test for corporate negligence liability).
69. Compare Candler Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Persaud, 442 S.E.2d 775, 775-77 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (allowing negligent credentialing claim where patient died during surgery), with Doe v.
Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 400, 645 S.E.2d 245, 250 (2007) (citing Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor,
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type of injury, a plaintiff could typically satisfy this element in proving actual or
proximate causation. 0
C. Common Defenses
Hospitals may defend against a negligent credentialing claim in several
ways. Although there is no common law affirmative defense unique to negligent
credentialing, the standard affirmative negligence defenses-such as
comparative or contributory negligence and assumption of risk7-apply as the
facts allow. 2 Additionally, a number of states have statutes that privilege
information produced, obtained, and exchanged in the credentialing process.73
These peer review statutes prevent litigants from discovering such information
and are designed both to encourage candor among medical professionals and to
allow 7a4 hospital's credentialing board greater autonomy in serving the hospital's
needs.

Peer review statutes do not typically penalize hospitals for waiving the
privilege, 75 and a hospital may invoke the privilege as a tactical defense. 76 A
plaintiff asserting a deficiency in a hospital's credentialing activities may have
difficulty proving the claim if the patient cannot access what may be the only
source of proof 7 7 For example, suppose a plaintiff alleges that a hospital

Licensing & Reg., 336 S.C. 373, 387, 520 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1999)) (noting plaintiff's burden to
prove injury or damages in a negligence claim).
70. This could be the reason that some courts combine negligence causation and injury into a
single element. See, e.g., Bishop v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, 331 S.C. 79, 88, 502 S.E.2d 78, 82
(1998) (citing Rickborn v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 321 S.C. 291, 300, 469 S.E.2d 292, 298 (1996))
(collapsing negligence causation and injury into "breach of [a] duty by a negligent act or
omission").
71. Note, however, that assumption of risk is not always an available defense to negligence.
See, e.g., Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 87, 508
S.E.2d 565, 573-74 (1998) (finding that the doctrine of comparative negligence subsumes
assumption of risk).
72. See Boles v. Urgent Care Pharmacy, Inc., No. COA05-540, 2006 WL 1984439, at *1
(N.C. Ct. App. July 18, 2006). Theoretically, a hospital could also defend against a negligent
credentialing suit by using negative defenses, such as a lack of causation of the patient's injuries.
73. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0193(8) (2007) (providing that, with limited exceptions, peer
review committee information is protected by privilege and not subject to compelled production);
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-133 (2006) (same); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCCUPATIONS § 1-401(d)
(LexisNexis 2005) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-30(2) (2004) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 621-202(a) (1997) (same).
74. See, e.g., McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys., 312 S.C. 58, 62, 439 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1993)
("[T]he public interest in candid professional peer review proceedings should prevail over the
litigant's need for information from the most convenient source.").
75. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0193(8) (Florida's peer review privilege statute); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-30(2) (North Carolina's peer review privilege statute).
76. See, e.g., Sun Health Corp. v. Myers, 70 P.3d 444, 446 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining
that a hospital was justified in refusing to make disclosures of information privileged by the peer
review statutes).
77. See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 310 (Minn. 2007).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss5/10

10

deHoll: Vital Surgery or Unnecessary Procedure? Rethinking the Propriety
2009]

TORT LAW

1137

negligently granted an incompetent surgeon operating privileges because the
hospital did not properly follow its credentialing bylaws. In all likelihood, the
most valuable evidence would be the surgeon's
privileging file, which the peer
78
review statute bars the plaintiff from viewing.
D. Development of the Claim
Negligent credentialing liability theory has existed for several decades.
Illinois was the first state to recognize negligent credentialing as a theory of
direct liability for hospitals, 79 but since then the theory has spread to other
states. 80 Today approximately half of the states recognize negligent credentialing
claims. 81 Although courts vary in their reasoning for adopting the theory, many
note a shift in public perception of hospitals from mere locations where

78. As discussed infra in Part JV.C., the opposite could be true; that is, producing the
privileged information may be the hospital's only way to rebut the plaintiff's showing of
negligence. A plaintiff could overcome lack of access to privileged information through use of
medical qualification expert testimony. See, e.g., Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14, at 3
(noting that the plaintiff's expert witnesses provided opinions that a doctor caused the plaintiff's
injuries, that a proper credentialing process would have prevented the injuries, and that the hospital
was grossly negligent in granting privileges to the doctor).
79. Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Darling v.
Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Il. 1965)). In Darling, a private doctor, on
call in the hospital's emergency room, improperly applied a cast to a broken leg. Darling, 211
N.E.2d at 255. The doctor later discovered this error and the leg required amputation below the
knee. Id. at 255-56. The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld a jury's verdict that the hospital was
negligent in not reviewing the doctor's work or requiring him to consult with orthopedic surgeons
on treating the leg, thereby imposing upon hospitals a duty of proper credentialing of private
physicians that, if breached, could constitute the proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff. See id. at
258.
80. See St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex. 1997) (Phillips,
C.J., dissenting) (noting the recognition of negligent credentialing liability in twenty-seven states);
Stottlemyer v. Ghramm, No. 91-L-181, 2001 WL 34084307, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2001)
(estimating twenty-five to thirty states); 18 CAUSES OF ACTION (SECOND) § 10 (2002) (listing
twenty-eight states).
81. See Humana Med. Corp. of Ala. v. Traffanstedt, 597 So. 2d 667, 669 (Ala. 1992); Purcell
v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165; Insinga v.
LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1989); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 189 S.E.2d 412,
414 (Ga. 1972); Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 257; Winona Mem'l Hosp., Ltd. P'ship v. Kuester, 737
N.E.2d 824, 828-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475, 485 (Mo. 1972); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'l
Hosp., 173 N.W.2d 881, 884-85 (Neb. 1970); Moore v. Bd. of Trs. of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495
P.2d 605, 608 (Nev. 1972); Corleto v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 538-39 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1975); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 411 N.Y.S.2d 901, 907 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Bost v.
Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash.
1984) (en banc); Utter v. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213, 216 (W. Va. 1977) (quoting
Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 142 S.E.2d 754, 756 (W. Va. 1965)); Johnson v. Misericordia
Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Wis. 1981); Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079, 1088
(Wyo. 1987). Cf Storrs v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 661 P.2d 632, 635
(Alaska 1983) (upholding a hospital's decision to revoke a doctor's privileges on grounds that not
doing so could have constituted a breach of duty).
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independent doctors treat patients to comprehensive medical care entities replete
with diverse staff positions and technologies. 82 A typical companion reason is
that hospitals often hold themselves out to the public as institutions whose
members collaborate in patient treatment. 83 Accordingly, courts have said that
hospitals should have to uphold this perception. 84
Not all states presented with negligent credentialing have accepted it,85
typically on grounds that a peer review statute immunizes hospitals from liability
for negligent credentialing. Colorado, for example, has held that its peer review
privilege statute bars a negligent credentialing claim against hospitals as contrary
to the public policies embodied in that statute. 87 Meanwhile, a limited hospital
malpractice immunity statute bars negligent credentialing claims against
hospitals in Kansas. 88 Arizona has officially recognized the claim
but effectively
89
nullified it by granting the peer review privilege a broad scope.

1I.

RELEVANT SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

At this time, no South Carolina statute or appellate decision recognizes a
cause of action for negligent credentialing. 9 However, a recent circuit court's
decision, if upheld, could change that. Regardless, any decision on the

82. See Elam, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (quoting Arthur F. Southwick, The Hospital as an
Institution-ExpandingResponsibilities Change Its Relationshipwith the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.
L. REv. 429, 429 (1973); Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944)).
83. See, e.g., York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 854 N.E.2d 635, 651 (111
2006) (noting that "hospitals advertise themselves as centers for complete medical care").
84. See Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 164.
85. See, e.g., McVay v. Rich, 874 P.2d 641, 645 (Kan. 1994) (explaining that a health care
provider is not liable for claims arising out of the professional negligence of another health care
provider).
86. Stottlemyer v. Ghramm, No. 91-L-181, 2001 WL 34084307, at *4-5 (Va. Cir. Ct. July
13, 2001).
87. Kauntz v. HCA-Healthone, LLC, 174 P.3d 813, 820 (Colo. App. 2007), cert. denied, No.
075C793, 2008 WL 115540, at *1 (Colo. Jan. 14, 2008). Similarly, Delaware's peer review
privilege law bars most negligent credentialing claims. See Svindland v. A.I. DuPont Hosp. for
Children of the Nemours Found., No. 05-0417, 2006 WL 3209953, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2006).
88. See McVay, 874 P.2d at 645-46 (quoting McVay v. Rich, 859 P.2d 399, 404 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1994)).
89. See Sun Health Corp. v. Myers, 70 P.3d 444, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). The remaining
states, including South Carolina, have either avoided answering the question of whether to adopt the
claim or have not yet had occasion for their appellate courts to decide the issue. See 18 CAUSES OF
ACTION (SECOND) § 10 (2002) (listing Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia).
90. The Strickland court acknowledged the doctrine's adoption in other states but did not
affirmatively join those states in recognition. Strickland v. Madden, 323 S.C. 63, 71, 448 S.E.2d
581, 586 (Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam). Moreover, the court did not make it clear what it meant by
"corporate negligence." Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 109-112 (discussing
Strickland).
91. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14.
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propriety of negligent credentialing will likely take into consideration the
following statutes and case law.
A.

The Peer Review Statutes

South Carolina law provides hospitals and doctors with limited protections
from liability and participation in discovery. First, a statutory privilege protects
all information concerning medical peer review proceedings and all data,
documents, and information acquired or created by parties to those
proceedings. 92 Known as the confidentiality statute, 93 it provides that such
proceedings and documents are not subject to discovery, subpoena, or
introduction into evidence in any civil action except on appeal from a peer
review committee's action. 9 4 These protections are not absolute nor are they
comprehensive.
As construed by South Carolina appellate courts, these provisions work in
favor of hospitals. In McGee v. Bruce Hospital System, the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the statute protected applications for staff privileges and
supporting documents. 95 In case of conflict over disclosure of the information
during litigation, "the public interest in candid professional peer review
proceedings should prevail over the litigant's need for information from the most
convenient source.' ' 6 The court noted that "[t]he underlying purpose behind the
confidentiality statute is not to facilitate the prosecution of civil actions, but to
promote complete candor and open discussion among participants in the peer
review process," 97 and that the "overriding public policy of the confidentiality
statute is to encourage healthcare professionals to monitor the competency and
professional 98
conduct of their peers to safeguard and improve the quality of
patient care."
Likewise, in Durham v. Vinson,99 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that under the statute, questioning a doctor about nonproduction of
privileged information was improper. Although the court found that the
attorney's inquiry was harmless error, it emphasized the importance of
safeguarding against such behavior in the future, stating:

92. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 40-71-20(A) (2001 & Supp. 2008). Additionally, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has held that the statutory privilege protects documents generated by the committee
and "all information, documents, or records acquired by the committee as part of its decisionmaking process." McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys., 312 S.C. 58, 62, 439 S.E.2d 257, 260 (1993).
93. McGee, 312 S.C. at 62, 438 S.E.2d at 260.
94. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20(A); McGee, 312 S.C. at 62, 439 S.E.2d at 260.
95. McGee, 312 S.C. at 63-64, 439 S.E.2d at 261. However, the statute does not prevent
discovery of general policies and procedures for monitoring physicians. Id. at 64, 439 S.E.2d at 261.
96. Id. at 62, 439 S.E.2d at 260.
97. Id. at 61,439 S.E.2d at 259 (citing Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111, 113-14 (Fla. 1992)).
98. Id.
99. 360 S.C. 639, 602 S.E.2d 760 (2004).
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If physicians can be questioned before the jury about the refusal to
produce this privileged information, the effect is to pressure them
toward disclosure of the privileging file. As occurred here, the exercise
of the statutory right not to disclose the information would be used
against the physician as evidence the physician is hiding something.
Allowing this to occur does not serve the policy goals of promoting
candor and
open discussion among participants in the peer review
100
process.
More recently, in Wieters v. Bon-Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hospital,
Inc.,1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals discussed a limited
.. 102 exception to the
statute applicable only to doctors and other practitioners. 1
[O]nly in one
narrow circumstance does a litigant have access to peer review information":
when that litigant is a physician appealing a peer review committee's adverse
credentialing decision.i°3 The court emphasized the narrowness of the exception
by noting what a broader exception would produce:
If peer review information is subject to compulsion beyond the narrow
boundaries enacted by the legislature, the foundation of the peer review
process would be severely compromised. Without the promise of
confidentiality of the information, physicians would not fully and
completely participate in the process or not participate at all. The lack of
candor and openness would hinder and thwart hospitals in their efforts
to effectively monitor physicians. 104
This exception was not the court's creation; rather, the court merely restated
an exception contained in the statute itself. 10 5 Thus, despite challenges to the
statute to acquire information in suits against both doctors and hospitals, South
Carolina's courts have thus far upheld the confidentiality statute as inviolate in
tort claims.
A second statute provides peer review committee members immunity from
monetary liability for nonmalicious actions taken pursuant to hospital bylaws
within the scope of the committee's functions. 106 Whether this immunity applies
to a hospital is not entirely clear, as there are no reported cases explaining the

100. Id. at 649, 602 S.E.2d at 765.
101. 378 S.C. 160, 662 S.E.2d 430 (Ct. App. 2008), vacated, 381 S.C. 332, 332, 673 S.E.2d
417, 417-18 (2009). The South Carolina Supreme Court's order denied certiorari and vacated the
South Carolina Court of Appeals's opinion because the circuit court's order was not immediately
appealable. Weiters, 381 S.C. at 332, 673 S.E.2d at 418.
102. See Weiters, 378 S.C. at 171-73, 662 S.E.2d at 436-37.
103. Id. at 172, 662 S.E.2d at 436.
104. Id., 662 S.E.2d at 436-37.
105. See id. at 171, 662 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20 (2001 & Supp.
2008)).
106. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-10 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
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extent of the immunity. 107 In analyzing the statute, though, the fact that it
protects these members only when they act within the scope of their duties as
members of a peer review committee indicates that the legislature sought to
provide immunity only for committee members acting in a professional capacity,
rather than an individual capacity. Combined with the fact that those who grant
privileges and conduct peer review will be acting as employees and board
members of a hospital, applying the doctrine of respondeat superior leads to the
conclusion that section 40-70-10 might protect a hospital. This reading has
support from the South Carolina Supreme Court, which has noted that a
hospital's executive committees-which consist of civilian board members and
physicians-are "committees" for the purposes of the statute. 108
B. Negligent CredentialingCase Law
State court precedent addressing negligent credentialing is scant. In 1994,
the South Carolina Court of Appeals avoided discussing the propriety of
negligent credentialing when it declined to •squarely
recognize a cause of action
109
for corporate negligence against a hospital.
In Strickland v. Madden, the
plaintiff asserted that a hospital was negligent in not stripping an allegedly
alcoholic doctor of his practice privileges.
Noting that other jurisdictions
allowed suits for "corporate negligence," the court refused to find that a hospital
owed patients a duty to review the competence of its staff physicians.i
Additionally, the court stated that even if such a duty existed, there was no
cognizable standard of care by which the court could determine whether the
hospital had breached that duty.
After Strickland, several commentators posited that because the South
Carolina Court of Appeals seemed somewhat hesitant in its decision, South
Carolina may eventually recognize some form of negligent credentialing. 113 This

107. The Person court decided that the protection only applies to the committee members as
individuals, see Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14, at 12, but because the Personappeal is in
its infancy, it is unknown whether the court's reading of section 40-71 -10 will be presented as an
issue.
108. McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys., 312 S.C. 58, 61, 439 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1993). Interestingly,
the Supreme Court of Texas held that a similar statute that immunized medical peer review
committees engaging in peer review from civil liability thereby provided a hospital with immunity
against a negligent credentialing claim. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 509
(Tex.1997).
109. See Strickland v. Madden, 323 S.C. 63, 72, 448 S.E.2d 581, 586 (Ct. App. 1994) (per
curiam).
110. Id. at 66, 71, 448 S.E.2d at 583, 586.
111. Id. at 71-72, 448 S.E.2d at 586. It is unclear whether the court used this phrase to refer to
the corporate negligence doctrine or the negligent credentialing cause of action.
112. Id. at 72, 448 S.E.2d at 586.
113. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr. & Hamilton E. Russell, III, Hospital Liabilityfor Torts of
Independent Contractor Physicians,47 S.C. L. REV. 431, 472 (1996); Robin Sloan Cromer, Note,
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prediction recently came one step closer to fulfillment in Person v. Carolina
Pines Medical Center.114 In 2001, Ruth Person requested that her private
surgeon, Dr. Thomas Mincheff, perform laparoscopic surgery to treat her severe
acid reflux.115 Dr. Brooks Bannister assisted in the operation.116 The operation
was unsuccessful and Person sued, alleging that Mincheff injured her colon,
spleen, and pancreas during surgery. 117 She also sued Carolina Pines, the hospital
where she underwent the surgery, for negligently granting Mincheff surgical
privileges. 118
Carolina Pines eventually moved for summary judgment, arguing that
because South Carolina does not recognize a legal duty of adequate
credentialing, Carolina Pines owed Person no such duty.119 It added that South
Carolina should not recognize a claim for inadequate credentialing in light of the
confidentiality statute's strong protection of peer review and design to foster
quality assurance.120 The trial court denied Carolina Pines's motion, finding that
South Carolina law does allow negligent credentialing lawsuits. 121 The trial court
went on to reject Carolina Pines's arguments that the confidentiality statute
should bar the claim. 122
Carolina Pines petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court for certiorari
and mandamus,• essentially
reiterating its arguments from its motion for
12312
summary judgment. The supreme court denied both petitions; 124 however, the
hospital prevailed both at trial and on post-trial
126 motions. 125 The case is currently
before the South Carolina Court of Appeals.

Court Considers Limitations on Recovery for Emotional Distress, Adoption of Doctrine of

CorporateNegligence, 47 S.C. L. REV. 160, 164 (1995).
114. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14.
115. Id. at 1.
116. See id. at2.
117. Id.
118. Id. Eventually, both doctors settled with Person for $1,000,000. Id. at 3.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 9, 15.
122. Id. at 11-12.
123. See generally Petition for a Writ of Mandamus or for a Writ of Certiorari, Person v.
Carolina Pines Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 2004-CP-16-322 (Darlington County Ct. Com. P1. Oct. 31,
2006) [hereinafter Petition] (arguing for the South Carolina Supreme Court to decide whether South
Carolina recognizes negligent credentialing claims).
124. Letter from South Carolina Supreme Court Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus or
for a Writ of Certiorari, Person v. Carolina Pines Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 2004-CP-16-322 (Darlington
County Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 2, 2006).
125. See Order Denying Plaintiff's Post-Trial Motions, Person v. Carolina Pines Reg'l Med.
Ctr., No. 01-CP-16-0813 (Darlington County Ct. Com. P1. April 7, 2008).
126. See supra note 15.
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ANALYSIS OF NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING IN LIGHT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Recognizing a cause of action for negligent credentialing in South Carolina
would be problematic because doing so runs contrary to established precedent
upholding respect for a hospital's judgment of doctors' qualifications 127 and
128
precedent that denounces reallocation of liability from doctors to hospitals.
Additionally, recognition would likely cause serious problems in the medical
profession and, consequently, would cause problems for those who rely on
medical professionals. While there are arguments in favor of recognition, none
of them speaks to any overriding benefits-to plaintiffs or to society at large-of
allowing the claim. To the extent recognition could improve healthcare through
the threat of litigation and economic liability, South Carolina law already
provides avenues to achieving that goal without producing the attendant
detrimental effects that
negligent credentialing would create for doctors,
129
hospitals, and patients.
A.

PrecedentUpholding Deference to the Hospital'sJudgment

Several South Carolina appellate court decisions indirectly reject negligent
credentialing by holding that a hospital's privileging decisions are not subject to
judicial review absent legislative or regulatory authority. 13 The supreme court
recognized this principle in Gowan v. St. Francis Community Hospital, where a
private physician sued
a hospital for injunctive relief after the hospital denied
• , 131
him practice privileges. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed dismissal
of the doctor' s claim, stating that the freedom of a hospital to make credentialing
decisions was a "longstanding principle" from which it would not depart. 132 Six
years later, in Lee v. Chesterfield General Hospital, Inc., 13 3 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals clarified this principle, stating that a court may review a private

127. See Wood v. Hilton Head Hosp., Inc., 292 S.C. 403, 405, 356 S.E.2d 841, 842 (1987);
Gowan v. St. Francis Cmty. Hosp., 275 S.C. 203, 204, 268 S.E.2d 580, 581 (1980) (per curiam)
(citing Khan v. Suburban Cmty. Hosp., 340 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ohio 1976); Strauss v. Marlboro
County Gen. Hosp., 185 S.C. 425, 426, 194 S.E. 65, 65 (1937); Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 144 A.2d
341, 344 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958)); Lee v. Chesterfield Gen. Hosp., Inc., 289 S.C. 6, 9, 344 S.E.2d
379, 381 (Ct. App. 1986).
128. See Newell v. Trident Med. Ctr., 359 S.C. 4, 14, 597 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2004) (per
curiam); Simmons v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr. (Simmons I1), 341 S.C. 30, 52, 533 S.E.2d 312, 323
(2000).
129. See infra Part JV.E.
130. See Wood, 292 S.C. at 405, 356 S.E.2d at 842; Gowan, 275 S.C. at 204, 268 S.E.2d at
581 (citing Khan, 340 N.E.2d at 402; Strauss, 185 S.C. at 426, 194 S.E. at 65); Edson, 144 A.2d at
344; Lee, 289 S.C. at 9, 344 S.E.2d at 381.
131. Gowan, 275 S.C. at 204, 268 S.E.2d at 581.
132. Id. (citing Khan, 340 N.E.2d at 402; Strauss, 185 S.C. at 427, 194 S.E. at 66; Edson, 144
A.2d at 344).
133. 289 S.C. 6, 344 S.E.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1986).
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hospital's privileging decisions when not prohibited by legislative or regulatory
action. 134 The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this view in Wood v.
Hilton Head Hospital,
Inc.,135 tracing the rule's existence in South Carolina law
136
1930s.
the
to
back
None of these cases involved a patient's direct tort claim against a hospital.
The cases that the Gowan, Lee, and Wood courts cite indicate that the courts
recognized, especially in private hospitals, that evaluations of doctors'
qualifications are best left to those with the most expertise. As the Khan court
stated, "[a] court may not substitute its judgment for that of the hospital trustees'
judgment." 137 Together with peer review statutes, this rule of independence
indicates that South Carolina's courts and its legislature have a policy of
protecting the medical community's ability to accurately judge the qualifications
of its members. In negligent credentialing liability, though, a court substitutes its
own judgment not only for that of the hospitals' trustees but also for those of the
medical executive committee, the peer review committee, department chiefs, the
physician, and the patient who selected the physician. Thus, allowing a claim for
negligent credentialing would contradict both the letter and the purpose of South
Carolina law.
B. PrecedentOpposingReallocation of Liability
Moreover, negligent credentialing conflicts with South Carolina law because
it imposes a distribution of liability that the South Carolina Supreme Court has
explicitly denounced. As discussed below, 138 the supreme court in Simmons H
set boundaries on the circumstances in which a patient could hold a hospital
vicariously liable for a private doctor's torts. 13 9 Simmons H provides that under
the doctrines of apparent agency or nondelegable duty a hospital may be
vicariously liable to a patient for a private physician's negligence because of the
patient's perception that the hospital, and not a particular doctor, would treat
him. 14 0 However, the
is not vicariously liable for injuries 141
resulting from
... hospital
..
patients meeting their private doctors at the hospital for treatment. Simmons H
thus implies a spectrum of liability progressing from direct liability, to vicarious
liability, to none. 142 Once outside the limits set by Simmons II, there is no

134. Id. at 9, 344 S.E.2d at 381.
135. 292 S.C. 403, 356 S.E.2d 841 (1987).
136. Id. at 405, 356 S.E.2d at 842 (citing Strauss, 185 S.C. at 427, 194 S.E. at 65).
137. Khan, 340 N.E.2d at 402; see also Edson, 144 A.2d at 344 (noting that the court has no
authority to substitute its judgment for the decisions made by hospitals regarding policy and
management).
138. See infra Part JV.E. 1.
139. Simmons II, 341 S.C. 30, 52, 533 S.E.2d 312, 323 (2000).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. This has support in the fact that vicarious liability is merely a fiction used to hold a party
accountable for what the party did not do or, in the case of an organizational entity, physically could
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cognizable causal nexus to the hospital left for the courts to make. At that point,
the only legitimate recourse is for the patient to recover only from the doctor
who negligently caused the harm. 143 However, negligent credentialing theory
posits a different system of liability. By alleging an additional wrongful act in a
malpractice suit, a plaintiff makes the spectrum of causation circular: once
vicarious liability ends at Simmons II, direct liability begins anew.
Other precedent indicates that South Carolina rejects this concept. The South
Carolina Supreme Court has dismissed a legal theory designed to produce
changes in the medical community similar to those changes negligent
credentialing liability would produce. In Newell v. Trident Medical Center,144 the
plaintiff argued that a doctor with hospital privileges was the hospital's agent for
145
the purpose of getting his patients' informed consent on surgical procedures.
Noting that Simmons II limited the applicability of apparent agency and
nondelegable duty in the context of malpractice cases, the court rejected the
plaintiff's theory because of the results it would produce:
If [the plaintiff] is correct [that the doctor was the hospital's agent], then
hospitals are potentially more responsible for the acts of admitting
physicians than for the actions of physicians who are independent
contractors as in... Simmons. We find neither precedent nor public
policy support such a re-allocation of responsibility and liability
between hospitals and physicians with staff privileges. 14
In other words, the South Carolina Supreme Court squarely rejected a proposal
that would hold a hospital liable for granting privile es to a doctor who later
harmed his patient during the course of treatment.
Instead, a plaintiff in a
medical malpractice suit against a doctor should recover only from the person
who most proximately caused the harm-the doctor. 148
In terms of shifting liability from doctors to hospitals, negligent
credentialing and the failed theory from Newell could not be more similar. Each
makes a hospital pay for the mistakes of a private physician with whom it has a

not have done itself. See S.C. Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171, 180-81, 348 S.E.2d

617, 622 (Ct. App. 1986) (describing respondeat superior as a fiction).
143. This point raises such challenges as: "What if the hospital's operating room nurse
assisting Dr. Davis was negligent?", or "What if the only reason the plaintiff became Dr. Johnson's
patient was because Dr. Johnson was admitted at Sacred Heart, where the plaintiff wanted her
surgery?" Neither case implicates negligent credentialing. In the former, the patient could sue the
hospital in respondeat superior negligence. In the latter, the circumstances have moved into the
realm of apparent agency; the plaintiff ultimately sought treatment based on the hospital's
reputation.
144. 359 S.C. 4, 597 S.E.2d 776 (2004) (per curiam).
145. Id. at 11,597 S.E.2d at 779.
146. Id. at 14, 597 S.E.2d at 781 (emphasis added).
147. See id.
148. See id.
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relationship more tenuous than it does independent contractors, and because of
that, each theory produces an outcome South Carolina's highest court has found
to be against public policy. South Carolina courts would also violate public
policy by embracing a theory which results in a "re-allocation" of liability that
the supreme court so recently rejected. 149 Therefore, recognizing negligent
credentialing would be inconsistent with South Carolina precedent.
C. Problems of Recognition
Additionally, policy considerations warrant rejecting the theory. Although
negligent credentialing could improve the quality of medical care by using the
threat of liability as incentive for hospitals to increase oversight of private
practitioners and limit credentials to only those most qualified to treat patients,
there is great potential for the claim to worsen medicine in South Carolina. By
shifting the primary purpose of peer review from quality care assurance to
avoiding liability, negligent credentialing incentivizes hospitals and doctors to
put litigation aversion ahead of patient care. 150 Hospitals could set unnecessarily
high, or seriously low, peer review standards; hospitals could eviscerate peer
review by waiving privilege to win otherwise unwinnable lawsuits; codefendant
practitioners and hospitals could use waiver of the peer review privilege against
one another; and practitioners could sue hospitals for denial of credentials.
Additionally, allowing the claim against hospitals could lead to transforming
peer review in other licensed professions into a calculus of avoiding litigation
losses.
1.

Undermining the PrivilegingProcess

As South Carolina
courts have indicated,
....
151 candor and discretion are essential
to ensuring quality healthcare in hospitals
and preserving honest and open
evaluation of candidates.152 Peer review committees rely on this independence in

149. Cf Wehle v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 363 S.C. 394, 402, 611 S.E.2d 240, 244 (2005) (quoting
Powers v. Powers, 239 S.C. 423, 427, 123 S.E.2d 646, 647 (1962)) ("It is manifestly in the public
interest that the law remain permanently settled.").
150. This Comment does not suggest that providing quality medical treatment and avoiding
liability are mutually exclusive. Improving conduct to avoid negligence liability can result in better
patient care; indeed, such an outcome is a prime goal of the theory of negligence liability. See David
G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort Law: A Comment, 73 CAL. L. REV. 665, 666, 669 (1985).
However, equally possible, and arguably more probable, is that the threat of monetary liability so
predominates an actor's decision making that avoiding litigation and economic loss becomes more
important than improving or even maintaining quality standards. The discussion that follows
focuses on the latter possibility.
151. See, e.g., McGee v. Bruce Hosp. Sys., 312 S.C. 58, 61-62, 439 S.E.2d 257, 259-60
(1993) (holding that a plaintiff's discovery request for staff privileged information at a hospital
violated the public policy of the confidentiality statute).
152. Id.; LEVIN, supra note 29, at 126 (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187,
188 (D.D.C. 1970)).
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determining something as amorphous as a physician's competence. 153 In
credentialing, the committee does not have a concrete definition of
"competence" but rather it determines competence on a case-by-case basis
according to the type of privileges the applicant desires. 154 After all, the purpose
of the peer review inquiry is to determine whether the candidate can perform a
procedure, 155 not whether a patient will ever sue the candidate for malpractice.
That the Joint Commission leaves determination of competency standards to the
156
limited discretion of the individual hospital's peer review committee
highlights the difficulty a hospital would have in predicting who is "competent"
enough to avoid liability. 157 Because of this inherent difficulty, arguably the
safest choice for a hospital is to effectively eliminate its discretion by making
competence synonymous with perfection. Rather than risk negligent
credentialing liability for the minutest flaw in a doctor's record, the litigationaverse hospital would substitute the judgment of the most plaintiff-friendly jury
imaginable 158 for that of its board members and review committee members,
regulatory agencies, and the patient who desired to select the private practitioner
to perform the procedure in question. 159
Such a strategy would lead to the denial of credentials to genuinely
qualified, albeit reasonably flawed, practitioners, thereby limiting their ability to
treat their patients because they do not have access to the sophisticated
16
equipment and staff resources that generally only a hospital can afford. 0

153. Recall that the overall purpose of credentialing is for hospitals to allow only competent
practitioners to treat patients on their premises. See Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301
N.W.2d 156, 170-71 (Wis. 1981).
154. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11151(9) (2000) (describing a peer review action as an evaluation
of an individual physician's conduct).
155. Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process:Moving from
Tort Doctrine Toward ContractPrinciples Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1179, 1233 n.242 (2006).
156. Elizabeth A. Snelson, Physician Employment and Alternative Practice Strategies:
Avoiding "Company Doctor" Syndrome & Other Medical Staff Issues, HEALTH LAW., Dec. 2008,
at 14, 16-17.
157. See David H. Rutchik, Note, The Emerging Trend of Corporate Liability: Courts'
Uneven Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 535, 562 (1994). This raises the issue of what criteria would be useful under such an analysis.
Does a surgeon lack competence to perform a particular procedure because she has only performed
it ten times before? Because she has only been out of residency for a year? Because she got a B+ in
a first-year medical school course? Because she believes human life begins at conception?
158. See id. at 561.
159. Cf Margo Schlanger, Second Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 517,
527 (2006) (discussing the prevalence of substitutes-measures taken primarily to avoid liability,
rather than correct a problem-in hospitals).
160. This strategy could severely impede the practice of medicine in South Carolina. Twentyseven South Carolina counties have a single hospital system (Abbeville; Allendale; Anderson;
Bamberg; Cherokee; Chester; Chesterfield; Clarendon; Colleton; Dillon; Edgefield; Fairfield;
Georgetown; Greenwood; Hampton; Kershaw; Lancaster; Laurens; Lexington; Marion; Marlboro;
Newberry; Oconee; Orangeburg; Sumter; Union; and Williamsburg) and four have none (Calhoun;
Jasper; Lee; McCormick; and Saluda). See S.C. Hosp. Ass'n, Participating Hospitals,
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Additionally, a hospital's overly sensitive credentialing standards could have a
snowballing effect upon a doctor's ability to practice medicine. 161 Given that
many hospitals already inquire whether another hospital has denied credentials to
an applicant 162 and that the National Practitioner Data Bank requires notification
whenever a hospital denies a doctor practice privileges, 163 a single denial could
put so dark a stain on a doctor's record that no hospital would be willing to grant
the doctor privileges. Combined with the likelihood of lawsuits 164 and everincreasing malpractice insurance costs, such diminished chances of acquiring
credentials may well deter people from pursuing careers in medicine in the first
place. 165
The possibilities are no better where the breach in question is either the
hospital's failure to develop peer review standards or its deviation from its own
standards. 166 In this scenario, hospitals have the opportunity and incentive to

http://www.myschospital.org/participatinghospitals.aspx (last visited May 18, 2009). A hospital is
currently under construction in Barnwell County. Id. Thus, even a single denial of credentials may
mean that a doctor and his patient would have to travel many miles to find a hospital that will grant
the doctor credentials. Alternatively, patients may not be willing or able to travel one or two
counties over to have their doctor of choice perform a procedure. In that case, a qualified
practitioner's practice could suffer or even cease to exist, further decreasing the availability of
patient care. See LEVIN, supra note 29, at 2.
161. See LEVIN, supra note 29, at 2, 4.
162. Id.at 2.
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 11132(a) (2000).
164. A patient is up to seven times more likely to sue a faultless doctor than a negligent one.
Ilene N. Moore et al.,
Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice
Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1195 (2006).
165. Such a scenario becomes all the more alarming-and realistic-in light of a recent report
by the Physician's Foundation stating that 49% of primary care physicians consider leaving
medicine because of these issues. Val Willingham, Half of Primary-CareDoctors in Survey Would
Leave Medicine, CNN.COM, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/11/17/
primary.care.doctors.study/index.html. The American Medical Association projects a shortage of
35,000-40,000 primary care doctors in the U.S. by 2025. Id.
One finer point is that allowance of the claim may additionally raise an acute danger for
attorneys, especially those practicing healthcare law. Hospitals may develop unofficial policies of
banning lawyers-particularly plaintiffs' lawyers-from receiving treatment in their facilities.
Reasons would include retaliation for a lawyer's previous accomplishments, fear that an attorney
will use treatment as basis for a future lawsuit, or a combination of both. It is no secret that
physicians and surgeons routinely make personal choices not to treat lawyers for these very reasons.
See Laura Parker, Medical Malpractice Battle Gets Personal, USA TODAY, June 14, 2004, at A2
(quoting a South Carolina surgeon who referred to the practice as "hardball," but emphasized that
"it's ethical."). A surgeon who requested anonymity from the author stated that it is common
practice for doctors on call to create an excuse not to treat an attorney admitted to the local
emergency room. Interview with Anonymous Physician, in Charleston, S.C. (May 20, 2008). 'qlive
in a plaintiff-friendly county, and I don't want my family to lose our house just because I put too
many stitches in some guy's scalp after I stopped his brain from bleeding." Id. Worried about
credentialing liability, peer review committees could adopt this as an unofficial criterion.
166. Note, though, that this could only occur in a jurisdiction that looked only to local custom.
Because Joint Commission accreditation requires the development of adequate standards, as
opposed to any standards, a court basing the duty of care on Joint Commission criteria may hold
that peer review standards that fail the Joint Commission criteria fail breach of duty analysis. See,
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lower their quality standards so that plaintiffs would have difficulty proving a
breach of duty. This scenario not only contradicts a central premise of negligent
credentialing-that the threat of monetary liability should be an incentive to
improve the quality of peer review 167-but could also do great harm to patients.
A duty of care that looks only to adherence to an existing standard, rather than
the adequacy of the standard, could allow hospitals to circumvent liability by
setting peer review standards low enough to avoid inquiry that might typically
alert hospitals to problems with a practitioner's qualifications. Therefore,
allowing claims for a hospital's failure to develop or adhere to some cognizable
standard of peer review would be irresponsible because, rather than keeping
good doctors out of hospitals, it could let poor ones in.
2.

Choosing Between Liability and Effective Peer Review

In addition to problems resulting from a hospital's efforts to avoid litigation
and liability in the first place, issues may also arise from actions a hospital takes
during the course of a lawsuit. If a patient can produce sufficient nonprivileged
evidence to support a finding of negligent credentialing, it is likely that the only
way a hospital can challenge the plaintiff's case is by introducing peer review
information, which requires surrendering the privilege. 68 Thus, a hospital facing
a negligent credentialing claim will be faced with two unenviable options: keep
the privilege and lose the case, or waive the privilege and harm an important
medical process.
If the hospital elects the former choice, it will maintain the candor and
confidence of the medical profession as the legislature and Congress intended all
healthcare institutions to do. 169 However, a hospital would be upholding these
ideals at the substantial monetary cost of litigating claims and paying settlements
and adverse judgments, all of which will increase the hospital's insurance
premiums and other operating expenses. 17 Rather than absorb these costs, a
hospital would likely pass them on to patients or make reductions in the quantity
and quality of its staff, services, equipment, and facilities (or both). The latter
choice is no more attractive. In this situation, the hospital surrenders its privilege
to win the case, but in the process it loses the confidence of practitioners who,
now knowing that a plaintiff could use the slightest imperfection against them or

e.g., Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170-71 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (deciding that courts should
hold the hospital's standard of care to the accreditation standards of the Joint Commission).
167. See Moss, supra note 21, at 150.
168. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14, at 11.
169. In addition to the peer review statutes and case law discussed above in Part m11,
Congress
has concluded that peer review plays a fundamental role in the medical profession. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 11101(5) (2000). Thus, surrendering the privilege would be contrary to both federal and state
policy.
170. See Nathan Hershey & Christine M. Jarzab, Looking at Accountability 40 Years After
Darling, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 437, 439 (2005).
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the hospital, will no longer be candid. 171 Peer review thus becomes an
adversarial process wherein applicants try to hide their weaknesses and hospitals
try to expose them. 172
These scenarios are not mutually exclusive. Particularly in "plaintifffriendly" areas, a hospital could surrender the privilege and disclose information
to rebut a negligent credentialing claim but still lose the lawsuit. The medical
community would forfeit the usefulness of peer review and the hospital would
incur losses. Even if an appellate court decided that the record did not support
the trial's outcome and reversed in favor of the hospital, 173 the appellate court
could not restore the trust and candor erased by an earlier waiver of privilege.
3.

CreatingLitigationAdversity Between Practitionersand Hospitals

In addition to the systemic impacts the claim would likely have upon
patients and medical providers, it could also foster further breakdown of the
medical community through competitive litigation strategy. Because the
confidentiality statute does not prohibit a protected party from surrendering the
privilege, 174 this creates opportunities for codefendant doctors and hospitals to
prejudice each other by helping the plaintiff. A plaintiff could thus use an offer
of a relatively inexpensive settlement to persuade a doctor or hospital into
settling in exchange for waiving the privilege and producing credentialing
information. The plaintiff would then obtain the information she needs to pursue
a malpractice claim against the remaining defendant. Similarly, the doctor or the
hospital may try to get out of the suit as soon as possible and offer to waive the
privilege in exchange for settlement.
Regardless of the circumstances, the ability to waive the privilege would
create a race between doctors and hospitals to be the first to settle, leading to
distrust between doctors and hospitals. A hospital would be reluctant to grant
privileges to a competent doctor based on worries that the doctor might turn on
175
the hospital when a plaintiff eventually sued the doctor for malpractice.

171. See George E. Newton II, Comment, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social
and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 723-24 (2001) (citing
Jeanne Darricades, Comment, Medical Peer Review: How is it Protected by the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986?, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 263, 263 (1992)).
172. Cf Philip L. Merkel, Physicians Policing Physicians: The Development of Medical Staff
Peer Review Law at California Hospitals, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 301, 330 (2004) (criticizing
credentialing for the animus it creates between hospitals and doctors appealing denial of
credentials).
173. Note that a jury's verdict can be set aside only if a party can show that no reasonable jury
could have formed its decision under the evidence provided. See Bums v. Universal Health Servs.,
Inc., 361 S.C. 221, 231-32, 603 S.E.2d 605, 611 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Horry County v. Laychur,
315 S.C. 364, 367, 434 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1993); Force v. Richland Mem'l Hosp., 322 S.C. 283, 284,
471 S.E.2d 714, 715 (Ct. App. 1996)).
174. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-20 (2001 & Supp. 2008).
175. Many doctors will be sued for malpractice at least once in their lives, even though there
appears to be no clear causal correlation between a doctor's medical qualifications and the
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Because a hospital may do the same thing, a doctor may likewise be hesitant to
practice medicine at a hospital. In either case, the end result would be an erosion
of cooperation among practitioners and hospitals.
4.

Exposing Hospitalsto Other Types of Liability

A hospital that sets credentialing standards designed to avoid liability could
still incur liability to private physicians. If a hospital denies, revokes, or restricts
a doctor's privileges,
doctor may have grounds to contest the decision
by
176 that •••177
178
•
suing the hospital. A suit could include allegations of slander, antitrust,
interference with contract, 179 or constitutional due process violations. 18 If a
doctor succeeded in such a suit, the hospital would be punished for maintaining
high standards, at least temporarily. Thus, exercising stringent credentialing
standards could actually hold little financial appeal for the hospital.
5. Affecting Other Licensed Professions
Finally, allowing plaintiffs to sue hospitals for negligent peer review may
open the door to expand the cause of action to other peer-reviewed professions.
In addition to hospitals, the peer review statutes protect a number of other
important professions, including "legal... osteopathic, optometric, chiropractic,
psychological,
dental,
accounting,
pharmaceutic,
and
engineering
organizations." If South Carolina courts eviscerate the legislature's protections
as applied to hospitals, there may be little reason to continue extending those
protections to industries that provide important, but not vital, services. The claim
could apply to virtually any entity that engages in licensure or other qualification

likelihood of being found liable for malpractice. See John W. Ely et al., Malpractice Claims Against
Family Physicians: Are the Best Doctors Sued More?, 48 J. FAM. PRAC. 23, 25 (1999). Male
physicians have a 56% chance of being sued over a ten-year practice period. Id. at 27.
176. See, e.g., Burdge v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 318 S.C. 312, 314, 457 S.E.2d 610, 611
(1995) (stating that a physician filed suit against a hospital for suspending his staff privileges
without a proper hearing).
177. See, e.g., Wieters v. Bon-Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc., 378 S.C. 160, 163, 662
S.E.2d 430, 432 (Ct. App. 2008), vacated, 381 S.C. 332, 332, 673 S.E.2d 417, 417-18 (2009)
(involving a situation where a physician sued a hospital for slander after the hospital reported details
of the suspension to a national data bank).
178. LEVIN, supra note 29, at 15-16. Antitrust situations include (1) when the hospital denies
a physician's initial application for privileges; (2) when the hospital terminates, suspends, or
reduces existing privileges; (3) when the hospital denies a non-physician practitioner (such as a
midwife) clinical privileges; (4) when there is a physician boycott; and (5) when the hospital makes
exclusive contractual arrangements for medical services. Id.
179. See id. at 101.
180. Cf Burdge, 318 S.C. at 314, 457 S.E.2d at 611 (involving a physician who brought a
claim for violation of due process rights after a hospital suspended his privileges).
181. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-71-10(A) (2001 & Supp. 2008).
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review activities. 182 Accordingly, negligent credentialing could transform peer
review of many important, licensed service positions from a substantive inquiry
of fitness for duty into an economics-based conjecture of a candidate's
likelihood of attracting litigation in the future.
These possibilities may read like a parade of horribles. This does not change
the fact that negligent credentialing could well negatively impact healthcare in
South Carolina. Courts should not disregard the potential for patients, doctors,
and hospitals alike to abuse a new liability-based regime of peer review.
D. Benefits of Recognition
There are of course arguments in favor of recognizing the claim. First,
hospitals, as full-service
have a duty to protect their patients from
•• institutions,
183
incompetent practitioners.
Imposing this duty upon hospitals via negligent
credentialing allows plaintiffs184g
geater recovery
against
by triggering
r
m
in hospitals
h
additional insurance payouts
and improves medicine through the negative
incentive of liability. 185 Each point has its merits and its problems.
1.

Conformity with PatientPerception

The traditional view of healthcare is that only a properly educated and
186
licensed individual doctor, and not a corporation, could practice medicine.
Under this view, a hospital is powerless under the law to control a physician or
surgeon in the practice of his profession; correspondingly, the doctor bears all
liability for harm caused by his conduct. 187 Hospitals are thus locations that
provide doctors with a site and equipment to treat patients.
States that have adopted negligent credentialing have abandoned this view
by instead considering a hospital as an active entity that appoints physicians and
surgeons to its staff, employs a variety of medical practitioners on a salaried
basis, and directly charges and bills patients for services rendered and for use of

182. One attorney has analogized the hospital negligent credentialing claim to a legal
malpractice victim suing the state's bar or highest court for allowing his attorney to practice law.
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Person v. Carolina Pines Reg'l
Med. Ctr., No. 2004-CP-16-322 (Darlington County Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 5, 2005).
183. See Moss, supra note 21, at 150.
184. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
185. Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Pedroza, 677
P.2d at 170.
186. See, e.g., McMillan v. Durant, 312 S.C. 200, 203 n.2, 439 S.E.2d 829, 831 n.2 (1993)
(citing 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 21 (1991)) ("A hospital as an entity cannot practice medicine, diagnose
an illness, or establish a course of treatment .... ).
187. Cf. Newell v. Trident Med. Ctr., 359 S.C. 4, 12, 597 S.E.2d 776, 780 (2004) (per curiam)
(finding there was no agency relationship between doctor and hospital and that informed consent is
a matter between physician and patient).
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its facilities. 188 These practices create a public perception and expectation that a
hospital assembles practitioners to work together as a team to treat and cure a
patient.18 9 Accordingly, a hospital has a duty to protect patients from physical
harm inflicted by private practitioners. 19 Thus, negligent credentialing liability
reflects a duty corresponding to the scope and administration of services in the
modern hospital.
The flaw in this argument, though, is that it summarily concludes that
hospitals deserve liability without providing any substantive policy justifications
in support. 191 Moreover, the argument breaks down precisely where proponents
of negligent credentialing claim it applies. Where a patient visits a hospital so
that a doctor of his own choosing may treat him using the hospital's facilities, it
can hardly be said that the patient has gone to the hospital with the reasonable
expectation that the hospital-and not the private practitioner-will be providing
the care and treatment. Thus, public perception is not a viable justification for
recognizing negligent credentialing as a South Carolina cause of action.
2.

IncreasedPotentialfor Recovery

Negligent credentialing is an attractive theory because it creates an
opportunity to recover from multiple sources for a single injury. Recall that most
courts hearing a negligent credentialing case require the plaintiff to prove two
separate instances of negligence-one by the practitioner and one by the
hospital. 193 For plaintiffs, the upshot of this is that they may trigger payouts from
the malpractice policies of the hospital and the doctor. The typical medical
liability insurance policy imposes recovery limits on a per-occurrence basis; that
is, the insurer
,. 194 will only pay a certain amount of money for each incident of
negligence. Accordingly, there could be substantial payout increases if a court
finds the hospital negligent in addition to finding the practitioner negligent.

188. See Beeck v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Adamski v.
Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 974-75 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)).
189. See, e.g., Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8 ("Certainly, the person who avails himself of 'hospital
facilities' expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees
will act on their own responsibility.").
190. Moss, supra note 21, at 150.
191. Rutchik, supra note 157, at 548.
192. Take the example of a pregnant woman: early in her pregnancy she develops a medical
relationship with an OB-GYN, whom she visits periodically during gestation. When the child is
due, she meets her doctor at the local hospital for delivery. It would be unreasonable for the woman
to believe responsibility for a safe birth has somehow shifted to the hospital at the very moment her
own doctor is physically delivering the child.
193. See supra Part l.B.2.
194. See, e.g., Conn. Med. Ins. Co. v. Kulikowski, 942 A.2d 334, 337 (Conn. 2008)
(describing a malpractice policy's limits as $1 million per occurrence with a $4 million aggregate
limit).
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Patients get a greater chance to collect fully for actual damages and receive
payment for their attorney's fees.
However, the mere possibility of reaching into two pockets instead of one
cannot justify recognizing a substantive theory of liability. 195 Furthermore, this
argument relies on the specious assumption that insurance payouts always fall
short of what a plaintiff deserves to recover. Whatever the realities may be for
the percentage of a judgment that a plaintiff actually recovers, damage awards
are based on actual harm caused and, if applicable, the amount of punishment
needed-not on how much insurance money is available. 196 If the award exceeds
what the doctor's insurer has agreed to pay in the event of an occurrence, the
doctor is certainly still obliged to pay the difference. 197 Negligent credentialing,
then, effectively transforms a hospital into an excess insurance carrier for cases
where doctors cannot make their injured patients
whole. As discussed above,
198
Newell rejects imposing such a role on hospitals.
3.

Improvements in the CredentialingProcess

A third pro-recognition argument is that holding hospitals liable for failing
to properly screen and monitor private doctors serves punitive and deterrent
functions; that is, hospitals will improve their credentialing practices for fear that
not doing so will result in monetary loss from litigation costs and consequent
increases in operating expenses. 199 If they do not, the courts will punish them
through adverse judgments, and then the sting of having to pay such judgments
will deter hospitals from repeating their conduct in the future. Either way, the
system improves and thus unqualified doctors harm fewer patients. 2°° On its
face, such an argument is compelling, as punishment and deterrence are indeed
two fundamental functions of the whole system of tort liability 20 1 and would
seem to apply in the context of negligent credentialing.

195. Cf In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 331 S.C. 540, 548, 503 S.E.2d 445,449 (1998)
(citing Ayyash v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 533 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)) (rejecting
economics argument in refusing to extend strict liability to medical service providers).
196. In fact, evidence of whether a party does or does not have insurance for the incident in
question is inadmissible in court. S.C. R. EVID. 411. Moreover, parties should not bring insurance
coverage to the jury's attention. Sarvis v. Register, 288 S.C. 236, 238, 341 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1986)
(citing Bartell v. Willis Constr. Co., 259 S.C. 20, 24, 190 S.E.2d 461,463 (1972)).
197. Cf. Conn. Med. Ins. Co., 942 A.2d at 337 (finding that a nurse practitioner was not
entitled to recovery of insurance proceeds because she was not a named insured and damages owed
in malpractice suit exceeded the amount her employer, who was an insured, was entitled to).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 144-149.
199. See, e.g., Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) ("The most
effective way to cut liability insurance costs is to avoid corporate negligence.").
200. See, e.g., Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 165 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (stating
that imposing corporate liability encourages hospitals to "oversee the competence of their medical
staff' with the intent to further "the health care interest of the patient").
201. See Owen, supra note 150, at 665.
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This is not to conclude, though, that the improvements would play out as
planned. A flaw exists in the dilemma hospitals would eventually encounter:
either waiving privilege to win a suit or losing the suit and maintaining
confidentiality. If the hospital elected the latter option, the punishment and
deterrence functions would not legitimately apply because the hospital would
pay for its rightful privilege-not for protecting the peer review process. At that
point, the hospital would be "punished" for upholding the confidentiality it had
established with its credentialed practitioners and for placing peer review above
its own monetary interest. Although the sting of monetary loss may still cause
the hospital to improve its credentialing practices, it would not be doing so
because the loss indicates that the hospital conducted itself wrongfully, but
because the cost of keeping the privilege and preserving peer review is too
costly. Thus, an additional policy argument against recognizing the claim is that
because negligent credentialing may punish acts that the law protects, it
undermines foundational justifications for our system of civil liability.
E. PreferableLegal Theories
The above discussion notwithstanding, wrongfully injured patients deserve
some recourse. However, a negligent credentialing claim is still inappropriate
because South Carolina law already provides several theories of liability that
allow patients recovery from hospitals, including apparent agency, nondelegable
duty, respondeat superior, and negligent supervision. 20 2 These alternatives allow
injured patients recourse against doctors and hospitals without causing the highly
problematic scenarios discussed above. Taken together, these alternative theories
subsume the applicability of negligent credentialing.
1. ApparentAgency
The broadest alternative to negligent credentialing is a negligence suit that
uses the theory of apparent agency to hold a hospital responsible for harm caused
by a doctor. Apparent agency allows a plaintiff to sue the hospital for the
practitioner's negligence, even if the practitioner is not an employee. 203 To prove
apparent agency, a patient must show that the hospital consciously or impliedly
represented the doctor to be its agent, that the patient relied upon that
representation, and that the patient detrimentally changed position in such

202. See, e.g., Simmons II, 341 S.C. 32, 47-48, 533 S.E.2d 312, 320 (2000) (applying apparent
agency to hospital litigation); Simmons 1,330 S.C. 115, 123-24, 498 S.E.2d 408, 412 (Ct. App.
1998) (applying nondelegable duty doctrine in hospital litigation); Doe v. Greenville Hosp. Sys.,
323 S.C. 33, 38, 448 S.E.2d 564, 567 (Ct. App. 1994) (upholding verdict against hospital for
negligent supervision); Andrews v. Amisub of S.C., Inc., 302 S.C. 122, 124, 394 S.E.2d 22, 23 (Ct.
App. 1990) (noting applicability of respondeat superior in action against hospital).
203. See LEVIN, supra note 29, at 14-15.
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reliance. 204 When a patient can show these elements
and a resulting injury, the
20 5
patient may directly recover from the hospital.
Combined with a negligence claim, apparent agency directly responds to the
public perception argument. Where a plaintiff s choice of the doctor is incidental
to, or dependent upon, the choice of the hospital, the plaintiff may assert
apparent agency as part of a negligence claim because of the plaintiff's
expectations about the hospital. Moreover, the plaintiff need not implicate the
peer review process as part of the claim by instead making the simpler allegation
that the plaintiff selected a doctor in reliance upon the hospital's representation
of agency. 20 6 Consequently neither the hospital nor the doctor needs to surrender
the privilege to defend themselves, and the patient does not need to compel
waiver to get information for the case. Thus, where patients perceive themselves
to be patients of the hospital or at least base their treatment decisions on the
hospital, apparent agency is a preferable substitute to a negligent credentialing
claim.
A leading example of apparent agency in hospitals comes from Simmons II,
in which the South Carolina Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to proceed on an
apparent agency claim for the death of her father, an emergency room patient,
even though upon admittance to the hospital the plaintiff signed a release and
acknowledgment that the doctors on call were independent contractors. 207
Despite signing the release, the plaintiff believed the doctors were hospital
employees.
The court concluded that the hospital's use of release forms could
not overcome the plaintiff's expectation that the hospital was responsible for
treating her father, and thus the hospital was liable under apparent agency.209

204. Shuler v. Tuomey Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 313 S.C. 225, 227, 437 S.E.2d 128, 129-30 (Ct.
App. 1993) (citing Graves v. Serbin Farms, Inc., 306 S.C. 60, 63, 409 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1991);
Watkins v. Mobil Oil Corp., 291 S.C. 62, 67, 352 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1986)).
205. Cf. Graves, 306 S.C. at 60, 409 S.E.2d at 771 (discussing elements for recovery using
apparent agency).
206. See Shuler, 313 S.C. at 227, 437 S.E.2d at 130.
207. Simmons 11, 341 S.C. at 36, 52, 533 S.E.2d at 314, 323.
208. Id. at 36, 533 S.E.2d at 314.
209. Id. at 47-48, 533 S.E.2d at 320 (citing Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr.,
628 N.E.2d 46, 54 n.1 (Ohio 1994)). Since Simmons II, the court has upheld the broad applicability
of apparent agency to suits against hospitals involving private practitioners. For example, in
Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4, 550 S.E.2d 319 (2001), a plaintiff successfully asserted a claim
against a hospital whose marketing of its neonatal program induced her to have her prematurelyborn son cared for there. Id. at 8, 550 S.E.2d at 321. Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has declared the primacy of apparent agency in hospitals: "hospital liability for non-employee
physician negligence is limited to apparent agency situations." Newell v. Trident Med. Ctr., 359
S.C. 4, 14, 597 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2004) (per curiam) (citing Osborne, 346 S.C. at 8, 550 S.E.2d at
321; Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 52, 533 S.E.2d at 323).
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Nondelegable Duty

As the Simmons II court noted, one limitation of apparent agency is that it
requires a representation of an agency relationship by the hospital, even if only
an implied one. 210 However, the courts in both Simmons I and Simmons II also
211
found the hospital liable because it owed a nondelegable duty to the patient.
When a duty is a nondelegable, a party may hire an independent contractor to
perform the tasks that comprise the duty, but the party remains vicariously liable
for the negligent acts of a nonemployee.212 Unlike negligent credentialing, a
negligence claim operating on a nondelegable duty theory does not need to
involve peer review. This is because the claim is not that the hospital negligently
let the offending doctor work in the hospital but rather that, through the fiction of
the duty, the hospital itself negligently injured the plaintiff.213 Thus, plaintiffs
essentially 214
prove their case against the hospital as though they were suing only
the doctor.
Therefore, a negligence suit enhanced with a nondelegable duty
allegation provides a plaintiff a remedy against a hospital without involving peer
review.
Although the current scope of the doctrine in healthcare lawsuits is not clear,
it is likely fairly broad. The Simmons II court recognized that a hospital has a
nondelegable duty to provide competent care to emergency room patients:
[An] ...entity entrusted with important duties in certain circumstances
may not assign those duties to someone else and then expect to walk
away unscathed when things go wrong.... [This principle] applies to
situations in which people must entrust that most personal of things,
their physical well-being, to physicians at an emergency room
intimately connected with and closely controlled by a hospital.215
The supreme court in Osborne clarified that the nondelegable duty doctrine is
not limited to emergency rooms. 216 To date, the only situation the supreme court
has said the nondelegable duty does not cover is where a patient is admitted to
the hospital "by a private, independent physician whose only connection to a

210. See Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 48, 533 S.E.2d at 320.
211. See id.; Simmons 1,330 S.C. 115, 124, 498 S.E.2d 408, 413 (Ct. App. 1998).
212. Simmons 1,330 S.C. at 123, 498 S.C. at 412 (quoting McWilliams & Russell, supra note
113, at 452).
213. Id. (quoting McWilliams & Russell, supra note 113, at 468).
214. See id. (quoting McWilliams & Russell, supra note 113, at 452). If,for example, a
plaintiff were suing because a surgeon removed the wrong foot, the plaintiff would allege that the
hospital had a duty to remove the correct foot and breached that duty.
215. Simmons II,
341 S.C. at 44, 533 S.E.2d at 318.
216. Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4, 8, 550 S.E.2d 319, 321 (2001) ("Although Simmons II
involved emergency room physicians, we did not limit our decision to such physicians.").
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particular 21hospital
is that he or she has staff privileges to admit patients to the
7
hospital.,

3.

Respondeat Superior

Respondeat superior, a common theory of vicarious liability, would apply in
cases where the treating practitioner is an employee of the hospital-be• it218a staff
doctor, medical resident, physician's assistant, nurse, or other caregiver. This
method of recovery has proven to be enduringly effective and lucrative for
victorious plaintiffs in tort actions against hospitals. 219 To show that a hospital is
vicariously liable for injuries caused by a practitioner, a plaintiff must show that
the practitioner acted within the scope of the practitioner's relationship with the
hospital. ° Conduct is within the scope of a practitioner's employment when it is
reasonably necessary to accomplish an employment goal and the practitioner
undertakes the conduct in furtherance of the hospital's business. 221 Where the
employment or agency relationship
to the hospital is clear,
a patient
may
directly
•
• 222
.
.
sue the hospital for negligence under respondeat superior in addition to suing
223
the doctor.
Applying this doctrine would not require allegations of
wrongdoing in peer review, as the plaintiff may instead impute the injurer's
negligence to the hospital.
4.

Negligent Supervision

Lastly, a plaintiff may attack the conduct of the hospital by showing
negligence in supervising the practitioner. Similar to negligent credentialing,
negligent supervision allows a plaintiff to hold a party liable for failing to
exercise reasonable care in supervising someone-typically an employee-who

217. Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 52, 533 S.E.2d at 323.
218. See McMillan v. Durant, 312 S.C. 200, 203 n.2, 439 S.E.2d 829, 831 n.2 (1993) (citing
41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 21 (1991)).
219. A recent example comes from a case in Anderson County in which a jury awarded a
plaintiff $2.2 million for complications arising during an extended hospital stay. See Brad Maxwell,
Woman Wins $2.2M Case Against AnMed, ANDERSON INDEP.-MAIL (Anderson, S.C.), June 21,
2008, at A8.
220. See S.C. Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171, 179, 348 S.E.2d 617, 621 (Ct.
App. 1986) (requiring that servants act within the scope of employment for masters to be liable
under respondeat superior).
221. See Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 227, 317 S.E.2d 748, 753
(Ct. App. 1984) (citing Lane v. Modern Music, Inc., 244 S.C. 299, 305, 136 S.E.2d 713, 716
(1964)) (defining the test for scope of employment in the context of a false imprisonment action).
222. See, e.g., McMillan, 312 S.C. at 203 n.2, 439 S.E.2d at 831 n.2 (citing 41 C.J.S. Hospitals
§ 21 (1991)) ("[A] hospital may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees.").
223. See S.C. Ins. Co., 290 S.C. at 183, 348 S.E.2d at 624 ("[U]nder the doctrine of respondeat
superior,the principal is liable in addition to the agent, not by reason of his consent to be liable, but
by operation of law.").
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causes harm to the plaintiff.224 This duty covers the "employee's actions
undertaken in his capacity as an agent for the employer."225 Such a claim extends
to hospitals that fail to adequately supervise private physicians because the
physicians' credentials act as licenses for them to enter onto hospital property
226
and use hospital equipment.
Because the hospital allows the doctor to admit
patients and knows that the doctor is treating them using hospital facilities, the
hospital has a duty to ensure that the doctor exercises reasonable care in the
227
hospital . 7 This additional occurrence of negligence would be particularly
satisfying to a plaintiff trying to trigger a payout from the hospital's insurance
policy in addition to the physician's.
Taken together, these theories obviate the need for negligent credentialing.
This becomes clear when one asks: Why did the patient come to the hospital? If
the patient came to be treated by the hospital, respondeat superior controls
employee negligence, and either apparent agency or the nondelegable duty
doctrine controls nonemployee negligence. Negligent supervision may apply in
any of those scenarios. Where none of these avenues is open, it can only mean
that there is an insufficient nexus to the hospital to establish liability.2 8 In such
circumstances it would be improper to hold a hospital liable for an injury caused
by a doctor's independent relationship with his patient;2 9 after all, the patient,
not the hospital, chose the doctor. The patient's own doctor caused the injury,
and it matters not whether the injury incidentally occurred within a hospital's
walls; it could just as easily have happened at the doctor's office or the plaintiff's
home. Yet in such a case, the plaintiff still has a remedy by suing the doctor for
malpractice. Therefore, South Carolina stands to gain nothing through allowing
negligent credentialing claims.

224. Degenhart v. Knights of Columbus, 309 S.C. 114, 116-17, 420 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1992)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965)).

225. Charleston, S.C. Registry for Golf & Tourism, Inc. v. Young Clement Rivers & Tisdale,
L.L.P., 359 S.C. 635, 645 n.2, 598 S.E.2d 717, 723 n.2 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Degenhart,309 S.C.
at 117, 420 S.E.2d at 496-97).
226. See Oehler v. Humana, Inc., 775 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1989) (per curiam) ("[A] hospital
may be liable for the negligent supervision of a nonemployee physician who has staff
privileges ....); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (imposing a duty on
possessors of land and chattels to ensure that others who the possessors allow to use the land or
chattel and are not servants exercise reasonable care).
227. See Oehler, 775 P.2d at 1272.
228. The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that "[s]uch patients could not reasonably
believe his or her physician is a hospital employee." Simmons II,341 S.C. 32, 52, 533 S.E.2d 312,
323 (2000).
229. See, e.g., Campbell v. Emma Laing Stevens Hosp., 499 N.Y.S.2d 993, 994 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986) (holding that a hospital was not liable for not intervening in the relationship between an
independent physician and his patient).
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PROPRIETY OF THE PERSON DECISION

If South Carolina courts nonetheless decide to recognize negligent
credentialing claims, they should wait until the proper moment for recognizing
the claim. Person is not an adequate landmark for such an expansion of tort
liability because its facts do not conform to the cause of action. Moreover,
Person does not provide a sound foundation for recognition of the claim because
the trial court's reasoning for recognition is misguided. Using Person as the
landmark for accepting negligent credentialing in South Carolina would set a
faulty precedent.
A.

FactualShortcomings of Person

A justification for recognition of the negligent credentialing claim is that
patients have no choice but to place "blind faith" in the qualifications of their
doctors.230 Assuming that this assertion has merit in the context of private
physicians with whom patients have formed independent professional
relationships prior to visiting the hospital, it does not apply to Person. Rather
than blindly
.... trusting her
231 surgeon, Ms. Person had a longstanding professional
relationship with him, during which time she could have formed an opinion as
to his competence. Moreover, another reason why the facts do not conform to a
case for negligent credentialing is that the plaintiff lost at trial. 232 Furthermore,
after the court took the "unusual" step of permitting Ms. Person to conduct
postverdict discovery, it concluded that, even with
the newly-discovered
2 33
evidence, her case lacked merit and upheld the verdict.
Because of this shortcoming, future litigants will not be able to use Person
for meaningful guidance as to what the claim entails in South Carolina. Instead,
hospitals, doctors, courts, and attorneys will have an example of what does not
qualify as a claim. This will create confusion as to what constitutes negligent
credentialing, which could lead to inconsistent applications of the theory
throughout trial courts. South Carolina's medical and legal communities will be
better informed about the nature and scope of a negligent credentialing action if
the appellate courts choose a more factually appropriate case as the landmark for
expanding hospital liability.

230. See Moss, supra note 21, at 128 (citing Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 342,
351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
231. See Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandamus or for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Circuit Court at 2, Person v. Carolina Pines Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 2004-CP-16-322
(Darlington County Ct. Com. P1. Oct. 31, 2006).
232. See Judgment in a Civil Case at 1, Person v. Carolina Pines Reg'1 Med. Ctr., No. 2004CP-16-322 (Darlington County Ct. Com. P1. Nov. 14, 2006).
233. Order Denying Plaintiff's Post-Trial Motions at 1, Person v. Carolina Pines Reg'l Med.
Ctr., No. 01-CP-16-0813 (Darlington County Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 7, 2008).
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B. The Court's Misreading of Case Law
Person additionally fails to be an adequate landmark because the circuit
court's decision to allow a negligent credentialing claim results from its
misreading of precedent and confusing the concepts of nondelegable duty and
negligent credentialing. The trial court found it "beyond dispute" that Simmons I
established patients' right to sue hospitals for "breaching a duty to properly staff
and supervise emergency rooms."' 3 In no way, though, did the Simmons
opinions set forth a hospital's specific liability under the umbrella concept of
corporate negligence. Rather, Simmons specifically established that "hospitals
have a nondelegable duty to render competent service to the patients of their
emergency rooms."235 The Simmons I court was surely aware of Strickland and
negligent credentialing, yet the court instead focused on the nondelegable duty
theory. Furthermore, as the Simmons I court noted, "[t]he difference between
direct liability and a nondelegable duty is subtle but important.' 236 With a
nondelegable duty, the party may delegate the duty itself to another but may not
delegate liability for performing that duty.2 3 7 The Simmons I court acknowledged
this by distinguishing a nondelegable duty as a type of vicarious liability from
direct liability. 8 The Person court overlooked this distinction and contrarily
concluded that Simmons II allows patients to bring negligent credentialing
actions for emergency room malpractice.2 3 9 Finally, the Person court erred by
believing that the Simmons II court cited an Alaska case in support of adopting
corporate negligence in South Carolina. 2 0 However, the Simmons II opinion
cites Jackson v. Power for support
in recognizing the nondelegable duty
24 1
doctrine, not negligent credentialing.
Thus, the Person court essentially relied on Simmons I and Simmons II to
expand the scope of a theory that South Carolina courts have never recognized.
The Simmons II court made it clear that it was adopting the nondelegable duty
doctrine, not corporate negligence. 24 2 In making that clarification, the Simmons I
court noted how unfortunate it was that courts and commentators confuse and

234. Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14. The court then extended the duty into
operating rooms. See id. at 9-10.
235. Simmons 1, 330 S.C. 115, 124, 498 S.E.2d 408, 413 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 123, 498 S.C. at 412.
237. Id. (quoting McWilliams & Russell, supra note 113, at 452).
238. Id. (quoting McWilliams & Russell, supra note 113, at 468). Note, though, that the
Simmons II court did not alter this distinction. See Simmons II, 341 S.C. 32, 42, 533 S.E.2d 312, 317
(2000) (citing Simmons 1, 330 S.C. at 123, 498 S.E.2d at 412).
239. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14.
240. See id. (citing Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1385 (Alaska 1987), superseded by
statute, ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.096 (2008), as recognized in Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d
1046, 1067 (Alaska 2002)).
241. See Simmons II, 341 S.C. at 44, 533 S.E.2d at 318 (citing Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1385).
242. See id. at 48, 533 S.E.2d at 320.
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misuse the terms "corporate negligence" and "nondelegable duty" ; despite this
warning, this appears to be precisely what the Person court did. 2U It mistook
nondelegable duty to mean corporate negligence, and then, recognizing that
negligent credentialing falls under corporate negligence, it found a theory of
liability between the lines of Simmons 11.24 5 If anything, the only legal theory the
Person court could have extended into South Carolina's operating rooms is the
theory of nondelegable duty.
The Person court also misread Strickland in support of its decision. In
reviewing Strickland, the Person court thought that Strickland implied
acceptance of negligent credentialing because that court cited a Washington
24 7
case as an example of another state's acceptance of corporate negligence.
However, the Strickland court specifically cited Pedroza v. Bryant concerning
the nondelegable duty doctrine, not negligent credentialing, and balked on the
issue of allowing negligent credentialing claims. 24 8 The Simmons I court
acknowledged this reservation when it rejected Tuomey Hospital's contention
that Strickland squarely disallowed the claim. 24 9 However, the Person court read
this to mean that by implication, the Simmons courts adopted corporate
negligence wholesale, including negligent credentialing 250 To be sure, the
Person court accurately noted the Simmons I court's conclusion that Strickland
did not directly reject negligent credentialing or even the doctrine of corporate
negligence.25 1 However, it provided no further analysis to support its conclusion
that Simmons I and Simmons 1I established negligent credentialing liability.25 2 In
short, not only did Personmisread Simmons 1I and Strickland,but it also misread
Simmons II's reading of Strickland.
Thus, Person provides neither the factual basis nor sound reasoning for
recognition of a cause of action for negligent credentialing. If the appellate
courts wish to allow negligent credentialing claims, waiting for a more apt
exemplar would better serve South Carolina's attorneys, hospitals, physicians,
and patients.

243. See Simmons 1, 330 S.C. at 123, 498 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting McWilliams & Russell,
supra note 113, at 468).
244. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14.
245. See id.
246. See Strickland v. Madden, 323 S.C. 63, 71-72, 448 S.E.2d 581, 586 (Ct. App. 1994) (per
curiam) (citing Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168-70 (Wash. 1984) (en banc)).
247. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14, at 7-8 (citing Strickland, 323 S.C. at 7172, 448 S.E.2d at 586)
248. See Strickland, 323 S.C. at 71-72, 448 S.E.2d at 586 (citing Pedroza, 677 P.2d at 16870).
249. Simmons 1, 330 S.C. 115, 123, 498 S.E.2d 408, 412 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Strickland,
323 S.C. at 72, 448 S.E.2d at 586).
250. See Summary Judgment Order, supra note 14.
251. See id. at 8-9 (quoting Simmons 1, 330 S.C. at 124, 498 S.E.2d at 412).
252. See id. at 9.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Put simply, negligent credentialing has no legitimate place or utility in South
Carolina's jurisprudence. First, precedent indicates that the claim and its effects
do not comport with South Carolina's statutes and court precedents. Second,
recognizing the claim would exacerbate the problem of ensuring quality
healthcare because peer review committees would base credentialing decisions
on liability concerns rather than on merit and quality of care, and aversion to
increases in malpractice insurance and litigation may drive hospitals to reject
genuinely good doctors. This, in turn, may further discourage competent
physicians from practicing medicine, and the claim could unnecessarily increase
the cost of healthcare and unduly complicate South Carolina's hospital systems.
Instead, a more sensible course for all involved is the continued use of the
current legal system of tort remedies, which allows plaintiffs several avenues to
full recovery without damaging the medical community and the people it serves.
Andrew R. deHoll
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